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Abstract 
Instant messenger programs such as ICQ are often used by hackers and 
criminals for illicit purposes and consequently the log files from such programs 
are of interest in a forensic investigation. This paper outlines research that has 
resulted in the development of a tool for the extraction of ICQ log file entries. 
Detailed reconstruction of data from log files was achieved with a number of 
different ICQ software. There are several limitations with the current design 
including timestamp information not adjusted for the time zone, data could be 
altered, and conversations must be manually reconstructed. Future research 
will aim to address these and other limitations as pointed out in this paper. 
Keywords: ICQ, instant messaging, logfile, forensic, extraction  
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
ICQ is an instant messaging system by which users can send messages and 
files to other users, as well as interact in various other ways such as file 
exchange voice chat and the use of web cams. The official ICQ client logs all 
conversations and other interactions between users to file in binary format and 
stores this on the disk of the client machine. There are several different 
versions of the official ICQ client, with subtle differences between different 
log files for different versions of the software. This variety of logfiles and 
software versions and binary nature of the log file makes for difficult and time 
consuming forensic analysis of these files. 
Hackers and criminals often use instant messenger programs such as ICQ for 
illicit purposes and consequently the log files from such programs are of 
forensic interest (Mosnews, 2005; Poulsen, 2005). If ICQ itself is not used 
directly in committing an offence its log files may contain valuable 
corroborative evidence about actions or activities of the users (Anonymous, 
2002). 
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Instant messenger programs such as ICQ are often used by hackers and 
criminals for illicit purposes and consequently the log files from such programs 
are of forensic interest.  If ICQ itself is not used directly in committing an 
offence its log files may contain valuable corroborative evidence. 
Prior to this project some work had gone into working out the format of the 
database files by Soeder (2000), and further work by Strickz (2002). Their 
work documents the structures of the files and most of the components of the 
data structures used in the binary log files. The information provided by the 
two authors that provides good insight into the structure and purpose of the two 
different log file types identified by their work. While these files impart 
information about the structure of the log files, there is no information 
contained within on how to extract the information from the log files. The 
information in the documents contains information on the data structures in the 
database. 
A program called icqhr (Hitu, 2003) outputs log file information to a html text 
file, rather than XML and was used to assist in comparing the accuracy of the 
system under development. The tool has been black box tested and it 
accurately outputs the data that should be stored in the log file. Although, a 
Russian “hacking group” has created it, icqhr was invaluable as a reference. 
This paper outlines research that has resulted in the development of a tool for 
the extraction of ICQ log file entries. 
2. ICQ LOG FILE FORMAT BASICS 
2.1 The ICQ Log Files and What They Do 
There are two types of files that make up an ICQ users log files. The first is an 
index file we have called the IDX file. An IDX file is so named as it is the file 
extension for this file type. The file name itself consists of the users UIN 
(Users Identification Number) used to access the ICQ servers, followed by 
“.idx” extension. This index file contains a doubly linked list which serves as 
an index to the second file. 
The second file is the data file which contains the log records. The file name 
consists of the users UIN (Users Identification Number) used to access the ICQ 
servers, followed by “.dat” extension. We have called this file the DAT file.  
The DAT file is file of forensic interest. The IDX contains no valuable 
information on its own, however as shown further down, it can be used to 
reconstruct a DAT file from file fragments, or show which records are valid 
within a DAT file. The DAT file contains all of the log file information that 
can be stored by ICQ about a user’s interaction with other users on ICQ. 
Analysis of the IDX file was easily achieved the file layout was simple, with 
only a few data structures that required some interpretation. An IDX file was 
opened in a hexadecimal file editor and the information in the files were 
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compared to the documentation that was downloaded. This illuminated the fact 
that the files were written in little Endian format (least to most significant 
byte). Manual analysis of an IDX file is a time consuming process, even for a 
small number of entries, and there is a limited amount of information that can 
be gained from the file. The garnered information however, could be used for 
cross-referencing and verification of DAT file entries. 
To verify the information gained from the analysis was in fact correct, a test 
program called “IDX Reader” was created to extract information from the IDX 
files. The purpose of this program was to use the information gathered to 
extract all the entries from an IDX file and store the information in a linked 
list. From there the information could be output to screen showing the stored 
information that was extracted. 
2.2 Possible Reconstructing of Log Files from Fragments 
This paper presents ideas regarding possible methods for reconstructing ICQ 
log files. First a caveat, due to the fact that not everything is known about the 
log files, and the limited testing data, some of the information presented here 
may not work in all conditions or versions of ICQ, even though the IDX file 
structures appear to be the same over all versions of ICQ that implement this 
method of logging. The files used when forming these techniques had little or 
no previous data deleted from them i.e they may not be representative of 
extended and extensive use by user. It may be that deleted data affects the 
structure of the IDX files, and the ordering of these records. This would affect 
attempts to reconstruct IDX files. This possibility is currently a matter for 
further research. 
IDX files contain a doubly linked list of offsets to valid entries in the 
corresponding DAT file. These entries are numbered. Once the corresponding 
entry is located in the DAT file and identified by its number, its position within 
the DAT file is known from the offset given in the IDX file. There are two 
possible modes of reconstruction for the IDX files. One is to attempt to 
reconstruct the file, and the other is to extract what data can be extracted from 
the available fragments. The main reason for reconstructing an IDX file is to 
allow reconstruction of DAT files for forensically sound analysis.  
2.3 Reconstruction of an IDX File 
Reconstruction of an IDX file is relatively straight forward task if all the 
fragments of the file are available, which for explanation of the process is 
assumed. The IDX file itself contains a file header, page headers and the 
entries themselves.  
The file header is 20 bytes in size. It has the format shown in figure 1. As 
shown, it has a signature of 12 bytes at the start of the header that can be 
searched for. That signature will be at the start of a file fragment, as it is also 
the start of an IDX file. A page header will immediately follow the file header. 
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=================================================== 
== Format of IDX main header (20 BYTES): 
=================================================== 
00000000   3 LONGS     Unknown, but always 4, 20, 8. 
(04,00,00,00,14h,00,00,00,08,00,00,00) 
0000000C   LONG        IDX pointer to root entry 
00000010   LONG        ICQ database version 
                                         10      = ICQ 99a 
                                         14      = ICQ 99b 
                                         17      = ICQ 2000a 
                                         18      = ICQ 2000b 
                                         19      = ICQ 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2003a 
Figure 1: Format of IDX file header (Strickz, 2002) 
The page headers are 205 bytes in size and are always separated by space for 
1000 linked list entries (20Kb). The format for a page header is shown in figure 
2. Again the entry begins with a series of bytes, 20 bytes in all, that can be used 
as a signature to locate page headers.  
============================================================= 
== Format of IDX page header (205 BYTES): 
============================================================= 
00000000    5 LONGS      Unknown, but always 201, 0, 0, 0, 0. 
00000014    LONG            Pointer to next page header. -1 if this is the last 
page. 
00000018    LONG         Unknown, always 1? 
0000001C    LONG         Number of bytes in each slot (20) 
00000020    LONG        Number of fragments in the page with one or more 
                                                consecutive free slots. 
00000024    LONG            Number of empty slots in this page. 
00000028     10 LONGS     Unknown, always 0? 
00000050    125 BYTES    Allocation bitmap 
Figure 2: Format of IDX page header (Strickz, 2002) 
Initially, the IDX file is created with a file header at offset 0h, followed by a 
page header at offset 14h. This is followed by space for 1000 20 byte entries, 
making the initial file size 20225 bytes in size. Additional space for entries is 
allocated as required. Allocation is done by appending an additional page 
header, plus space for 1000 entries. From this we know that: 
? The size of an IDX file will be a multiple of 20205 bytes plus 20 
bytes. 
? Beginning at offset 20h, every 20205 bytes there will be a page header 
If all the page headers in the fragments are located, then the file size can be 
calculated. This is done by multiplying the number of page headers by 20205 
and adding 20, to get the size of the file. This will only work if all page headers 
are properly identified.  
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Alternatively another method is the highest value next pointer can be located 
and 20205 bytes can be added to that to get the expected file size. The page 
headers can be ordered in ascending order by their next pointers. The first page 
header is always located at offset 14h, and the remainder located at intervals of 
20205 bytes. To locate position of a page header subtract 4EEDh from the next 
pointer to find offset at which the header begins. All the page headers can be 
positioned in this manner. It is possible to locate the position of the remaining 
fragments by using the positioned fragments containing the page headers. 
Locate a valid linked list record near the end of a previously positioned 
fragment. The format of the IDX linked list entry is shown in Figure 3. 
========================================================= 
== Format of IDX linked list entry (20 BYTES each): 
========================================================= 
00000000   LONG        entry status? : -2          = valid IDX entry 
00000004   LONG        DAT entry number: 
00000008   LONG        IDX pointer to next entry (-1 = none) 
0000000C   LONG        IDX pointer to previous entry (-1 = none) 
00000010   LONG        DAT pointer to corresponding DAT entry (-1 = none) 
Figure 3: Format of IDX Linked List Entry (Strickz, 2002) 
It should be simple enough to order the remaining fragments by the DAT entry 
numbers in the linked list records contained in the fragments. The higher entry 
number fragments tend towards the end of the file and it should be possible to 
reconstruct the remaining fragments into the file in that manner. 
If it is possible to search for information in fragments at certain offsets, there is 
a second method that could possibly be able to identify the correct fragments 
and be used to automate the reconstruction.  This method would use the last 
linked list record in a fragment that has already been positioned in the 
reconstructed file, and noting it’s next pointer. This pointer would likely point 
to a linked list entry in the next fragment. The offset into the fragment could be 
calculated. The signature of a linked list entry is known. It is FE FF FF FF (-2) 
in the first 4 bytes of the linked list entry.  
Use the signature to search for an entry at that position in all of the fragments. 
If an entry is found there, and it is the next fragment, it’s pointer to the 
previous linked list entry would contain the offset of the last entry in the 
previous fragment (being the linked list entry used to find the next file 
fragment). 
2.4 Extracting IDX Information Without Reconstruction 
The required data can be extracted without reconstructing the file, however it 
may required to perform additional checks to identify valid records. The only 
identifier of valid records is the signature FE FF FF FF (-2), which identifies a 
valid record. Assuming that the signature is not found in any other position in 
the file (it may possibly be found in the page header bit maps), it should be 
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possible to dump all the valid records out to another file. 
As a result of analysis, three data structures were found in the IDX file namely 
file header, page header and the actual data. The file itself was found to be 
highly structured with predictable characteristics. Most of this information was 
already documented in the downloaded information, however there were a few 
observations made that, could not be investigated and explained in the time 
available. The first data structure found was a file header. The file header 
contains some unknown information, a pointer to the first record data structure, 
and the version of ICQ database. The file header is always found at the start of 
an IDX file and is 20 bytes in length.  Immediately after the file header is the 
second data structure, called a page header. A page consists of a 205 byte page 
header and space allocated for 1000 data record entries, making a total page 
size of 20205 bytes. When an IDX file is initially created, it is created with a 
file header an a single page, making a size of 20225 bytes. 
The page header itself consists of some unknown information, but includes a 
pointer to the next page header (or -1 if it’s the last page header), and 
accounting information about record sizes, number of record slots used and 
what record slots are allocated. 
New pages appear to be allocated on an as needed basis, as the current page in 
the file is filled. As page sizes are always exactly the same, if the number of 
pages is known, the exact file size can be calculated. This is useful if the file is 
being recovered after being deleted, however it does require that the last two 
page headers be located in fragments that can be pieced together, to create a 
single portion of the file. 
The reason for this is that as the pages are always the same size, the page 
headers are known to occur at exact intervals in the file. A page header that has 
a pointer to a subsequent page header can have its own position calculated by 
subtracting 20205 from the pointer value to gain the position of that page 
header. This can not be done with the last page header as its pointer value is -1. 
Hence the previous page header is required to get the pointer value of the start 
of the last page. Adding 20205 to that file offset gives the exact size of the IDX 
file. 
File fragments containing page headers can be positioned by ordering them by 
the values of their pointers to the next file. This is useful when reconstructing 
log files as the exact position of the start of each page can be calculated. 
The third data structure is the data records themselves. The data records are 
arranged in a doubly linked list of valid record entries, with each record storing 
the position in the IDX file of the previous and next record in the linked list. 
The other information stored in the record is the status of the entry, the DAT 
entry number and the file offset within the DAT file of that record. The IDX 
file can be used to find any and all valid entries in the DAT file, which contains 
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the logged information. This information can be used to help recreate DAT 
files from fragments, and also to help recreate IDX files, due to the file offsets 
that are stored. 
The IDX Reader program verified the information as correct, showing that a 
correct algorithm had been created for extracting IDX information. While this 
information was not essential to the project, it did provide the following 
benefits: 
1. Assisted with locating records in the DAT file for analysis 
2. Understanding of the way information was stored in binary files 
3. Verify programming techniques used for extraction of information 
4. Provide algorithms that could be used to provide further verification of 
data extracted from the DAT files 
5. Provide a tool to assist in manual analysis of the DAT files. 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE DAT FILE 
3.1 Dat File Recovery 
Dat file recovery should be simple once enough records have been extracted 
out of the IDX file. The record signatures in figure 4 could be used to locate 
records and their entry numbers. The extracted linked list entries could then be 
searched for matching entries, which would have the offset of the DAT entry. 
The list presented in figure 4 may not be a comprehensive list of all DAT file 
entries but it Strictz (Strickz, 2002) says that it covers most entry types. 
Various messages:     E0,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
Chat request:          
 E1,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
File request:            
 E2,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
My Details:              
 E4,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
Contact:                E5,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
Reminder:              
 E6,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
Note:                   EE,23,A3,DB,DF,B8,D1,11,8A,65,00,60,08,71,A3,91 
Figure 4: DAT entry signatures (Strickz, 2002) 
As different versions of the official Mirabilis ICQ client were released, 
changes were made to the structure of the log file databases. These changes 
mean that any program that extracts information from a database has to be able 
to identify the version of the program that created the database first, and then 
extract the information and format it according to the version of ICQ that 
created the file under examination.  
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Initial information that was downloaded showed numerous versions of the log 
files, each with differences that needed accounting for when being extracted 
and formatted. After some analysis, it was found that each record had a record 
header that is consistent across every version of the databases looked at. This 
header contained the length of the record, the record number, filing 
information, a message signature, and what was described in the 
documentation as a “separator value”. The record header is consistent across all 
versions of the ICQ database. Even the 2003a client database, which has 
significant differences from all other versions, appears to have this header 
format. 
Another consistency across all versions, 2003b not withstanding, was that the 
structure of normal text messages was identical. This made it much simpler to 
implement a system that could extract useful data. As ICQ is primarily a text 
based messaging system, much of the useful information could be expected to 
be extracted from these types of messages. It made sense therefore that once a 
program had been created to extract records that the first records that would be 
interpreted would be messages. This would allow extraction of text 
conversations in versions of ICQ up to and including 2003a. 
3.2 The Issue of Deleted Log Entries 
Initial research indicated that records were probably not deleted from the DAT 
file. Instead the records in the IDX file that referenced records to be deleted 
were removed. The freed record space in the DAT file would then be used as 
required. 
This often meant that whole and partial records were left in the DAT file. 
When the first attempt to create a program to extract DAT records was created, 
the program simply searched the file for the various signature values, read the 
record length and copied the data into buffers that was then put into a linked 
list. 
The problem with this was that when signatures from deleted records would be 
found, often parts of the records had been overwritten, including the start of 
record with the record length. When run over the test data, when a record was 
found with a length field that was overwritten to zero length, the program 
entered an infinite loop. The only to recover from this was to terminate the 
program. 
While this method would have been suitable for databases that contained no 
deleted data, it was clearly not suitable for databases that contained numerous 
records that had been deleted over time. It is also not suitable to ignore deleted 
data as it may contain vital information that could be used. This meant that 
using the IDX file to recover only valid records was also unsuitable. Another 
reason for not using the IDX file is that if it was deleted and overwritten it 
would be unavailable for use. The only useful way to extract the information 
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would be to locate and identify records and partial records in the DAT file and 
successfully extract them. 
4. HOW THE ENTRIES WERE EXTRACTED 
4.1 Creating an Extraction Algorithm 
Several ideas were thought up and worked through on paper, modified and 
refined until one method was found that would be suitable for extracting the 
log files and a prototype made. First a search function was created that would 
return the file offset of the next signature in the file, or zero if the end of file 
was found instead. 
The search function was called and then if a signature was found the program 
entered a loop. A data structure was created to store the record and accounting 
information about it. The search function was then called to find the next 
signature. If another signature was found then the length of the current record 
was calculated and the end position was calculated, if possible. If the previous 
record possibly overwrote the start of the current record then the end of record 
was calculated to be the last byte before the start of the next record. The start of 
the first record was always assumed to be valid. 
If the end of the record was calculated to occur after the start of the next record 
then the two records were deemed to overlap. The end of the current record and 
the start of the next record were recorded as “DIRTY” or “OFFSET” and the 
number of overlapping bytes was recorded with each record. 
The length of the record was calculated and that much data read into the data 
structure. Accounting information about the status of the end of the record was 
also added and then the record structure added the end of the linked list. 
Information obtained about the next signature was stored in local variables. 
The loop then iterated. After the next record data structure was created, the 
information would be copied to the new data structure. The loop exited when 
no new records were found. Once the prototype was able to extract all records 
and partial records, it was ported to C++ and record structures were added to 
for validation and output of data. Figure 5 shows the extraction algorithm used. 
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record?
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Figure 5: Extraction algorithm 
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4.2 Identifying the ICQ Version 
Initially it was thought that extensive examination of the record structures 
would be required to identify the version of ICQ being used. After some 
analysis it was noted that for the versions of ICQ listed in the downloaded 
information, the separator value changed with each version. The decimal 
notation of the separator value corresponded with the version number that 
created the log. What this meant was that a single record could be located and 
from that value the exact version of the ICQ client that created the log could be 
identified. 
4.2 Identification and Verification of Entries 
Identification of individual record types is also quite simple. The signature 
values are all 16 bytes in length. Most signatures differ only in the first byte 
with the last 15 bytes being identical. The first byte however, is unique to each 
record type and provides an excellent method for identifying the type of record 
being extracted.  
As information sorted out about the data that was contained in each data 
structure, a class hierarchy was created that had its root class as containing the 
header structure only. From there a level of classes was created that contained 
information common to all versions of ICQ for a type of record. The third layer 
generally contained information specific to individual record types. 
This allows the manipulation of records as a single record type, as a type of 
record such as “Message”, or as a specific type of message, depending on what 
was required from the data structure.  
Each data structure inherits a method called verify from the base class which 
can be overwritten. Verify is designed to verify the information stored 
specifically by that class if possible. Each class would contain information 
specific to that class and would be designed to verify the validity of that data. 
In the initial test version of this program, there was no validation of entries as 
to test the basic concepts only entries verified as being valid were used. In later 
implementations of the program validation methods would be identified and 
added to the program. 
5. TESTING 
Once the classes were created and a library of functions to do endian 
conversions created, outputting the records was quite simple. Streaming 
operators were created and the output was simply streamed to the console. 
Once a significant amount of work had been completed, a chat session was 
held and a small amount of test data obtained from it. The version of ICQ used 
was 2003a, the most recent version that can be analysed with this version of the 
extraction program. Using the log files that were obtained, three types of 
analysis was performed. These were manual, using the ICQ program itself to 
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output the history of the conversation, and using the extraction program that 
was created in this project. 
Initial results of this program are that the program is extremely accurate in the 
limited output that it can achieve with only one limitation. The analysis of the 
timestamps does not account for the time zone, which for Perth is GMT +08:00 
So far a fairly extensive amount of analysis has been completed allowing for 
the creation of this program. The program itself has the following limitations: 
1. Areas of possible concern for the algorithm have been identified and 
need to be investigated. This is further discussed in the next section on 
future work. 
2. Only the message structures being identified and output.  
3. There are no options to adjust time stamps for time zones or 
discrepancies in time. The program does adjust for time zones. 
4. Only complete entries that are marked as “CLEAN” are used. There is 
no validation of the entries that would allow the other records to be 
used. 
5. The extracted data records are not immutable, which means that they 
could be accidentally altered. 
6. The program does not sort by UIN number or time, so while all the 
messages are output they are not sorted into conversations, which 
must be done manually. 
7. The current data structures do not allow for the 2003b version of the 
ICQ client to be analysed. This is because the database is now 
distributed over a number files, signatures have changed, and the 
structure of the messages have changed. 
While these limitations reduce the usefulness of the program somewhat in it’s 
current form, it still has great usefulness in reducing the amount of time needed 
to extract useful information, which would then need to be manually organised. 
6. FUTURE WORK 
While records are being extracted from the databases, there is a large amount 
of work to be done. The first task will be to address the limitations that have 
already been mentioned above. The concern with the extraction algorithm is 
that although the current algorithm performs flawlessly, it depends on the first 
record being valid. Also the algorithm has yet to be tested with multiple 
“DIRTY” records one after the other.  Further refinements may be required to 
make the algorithm more robust. 
Another purpose for strengthening this algorithm is that it could be used to 
analyse partial database files where the first record in a file fragment is not 
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“CLEAN”. It is possible that once this project is completed, as second project 
or an extension of the current project is undertaken to create a program that 
locates database file fragments and reconstructs a database file. This is not a 
concern for this project, however it would be useful for a forensic analyst to 
have such a capability and this could be considered at a later date. 
There are a number of other data structures that need to be added to the 
program. These data structures all require that the version of the program be 
known as the data structures to be used are specific to that version of the 
database. Thus work needs to be done to properly implement objects for each 
version of the database that use the required data structures. These objects 
could be used to hold global database information which could be used for 
various purposes. What this data is has yet to be identified. However, 
validation routines could be expected to use this information.  
It is also expected that validation routines will increase the amount of 
accounting information that a record will need to keep about its associated 
data, such as previous and next records. Another concern is that only records 
that have a complete signature are found. In principle it is possible that a record 
could exist that contains useable data, however does not have a valid signature 
as it has been overwritten. It would be useful to extend the extraction algorithm 
to detect partial records without a complete signature. In this event, it would 
require the validation routines to be able to identify a record type from a partial 
record. Therefore research is required to determine how much of a record type 
is required before its type can be determined. 
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